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Abstract
This paper discusses 1) the generic forces that drive the evolution of diversified
industrial  corporations and their implications for the corporate technology base, 2) the
changing role of the central R&D lab in the context of these forces, and 3) the role of
management of technology in promoting dynamic coherence in diversified - and highly
decentralized - corporations. The line of argument in the paper is illustrated by an in-
depth case-study of Danfoss, a Danish multi-divisional corporation operating within
mechatronical markets.
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Management of technology may operate at different levels: It may be concerned with the
management of specific innovation projects, the management of R&D in a central lab or
in a one-business firm, a division or business unit, or it may be concerned with the
management of the overall corporate technology base in a diversified corporation. This
paper deals with the latter case. The notion of corporate technology base refers to the
corporation's total portfolio of technical capabilities and managerial competences in
developing new technologies, products and processes
1. In the diversified and
transnational corporation the corporate technology base is not a unified base with a
central organizational and geographical locus. On the contrary, it has increasingly
become dispersed in different parts of the corporation (i.e. the central R&D labs,
divisional R&D centres, engineering and manufacturing departments or design centres
or teams in business units and even in network relations with firms and institutions
outside the corporation).
In recent years there has been widespread "downsizing" efforts within headquarters of
large multi-divisional corporations. This tendency has also involved downsizing of
central R&D (i.e. in the form of corporate labs), decentralization of R&D to divisional
or business unit levels, and increasing use of external suppliers of technology. To the
extent that downsizing of central R&D has not led to overall downsizing of internal
R&D, these dynamics have arguably contributed to stimulate motivation and
entrepreneuship at decentral levels and a stronger market-orientation in technological
innovation.
However, a likely negative implication of downsizing central R&D may be increasing
corporate fragmentation which may contribute to undermine core competences, reduce
inter-divisional synergy and increase duplication of innovative efforts. Moreover,
technological innovation may become biased towards incrementalism and short-termism
at the expense of long-term exploration of new oportunities.
                                                
1 The notion of “technology base” is discussed more in-depth in Christensen (1996a).8
This paper discusses 1) the generic forces that drive the evolution of diversified
corporations and their implications for the corporate technology base, 2) the changing
role of the central R&D lab in the context of these forces, and 3) the (potential) role of
management of technology in promoting dynamic coherence in diversified - and highly
decentralized - corporations. Dynamic corporate coherence is here defined as the
corporate capacity to exploit and explore synergies from a diversity of capabilities,
competences and other resources (Christensen and Foss, 1996).
In section 2 “The Dynamic Forces of the Diversified Corporation and Implications for
the Technology Base” the Chandler/Williamson strategy-structure issue is revisited and
four generic forces characterizing the growth of the multi-divisional corporation are
identified: 1) Diversification, 2) increasing division of labour, 3) decentralization, and 4)
internationalization. The implications of these forces for the structure and profile of the
corporate technology base is discussed. It is argued that combined these forces have
promoted a creeping fragmentation of the corporate technology base and short-termism
and risk-aversion in R&D-investments. However, these forces have also given rise to a
stronger market-orientation in innovative efforts, and better possibilities to promote
inter-functional integration in innovative efforts.
These implications primarily hold for the "traditional" Williamsonian M-form, while
different M-form variants provide a more differentiated picture as discussed in section 3
“Variants of the M-form and the management of the corporate technology base”.
Especially I make a distinction between the “pure” M-form structures to realize financial
economies, an “synergistic” M-form structures to realize vertical or synergistic
economies, or in short, corporate coherence.
In section 4 “The Changing Organization of the Central R&D Lab” and  section 5 “The
Role of Corporate Management of Technology in Pursuing Dynamic Coherence” the
focus is narrowed from the overall corporate level to the specific level of central R&D
and corporate management of technology within technology-intensive “synergistic”
corporations. Section 4 attempts to give a broad outline of important changes in the role9
and organization of the central R&D lab, and section 5 focuses on the options for
managing the corporate technology base. Four objectives for the management of the
corporate technology base that may contribute to strengthen the dynamic corporate
coherence are briefly discussed:
·  Providing overall strategic guidance of the corporate technology base and
innovative efforts.
·  Providing "parenting value"
2 to divisions and business units in their innovative
efforts.
·  Assuring a proper balance and alignment between short-term, incrementally
innovative efforts (exploitation) and long-term explorative efforts.
·  Increasing horizontal technology transfer and sharing, as well as synergy and
coordination in research and technological innovation between divisions and
business units.
The line of argument in the paper is illustrated by different case material, especially
material from an in-depth case-study of Danfoss, a Danish multi-divisional corporation
operating primarily in mechatronical, industrial product markets (Iversen & Christensen,
1996)
3. Although Danfoss for decades has been a consistently successfull company, the
idea of using Danfoss as a case of reference is not to provide an ideal case of how to
manage technology in a diversified corporation, nor to provide empirical evidence for
the arguments in the paper. Rather, the Danfoss-case provides an opportunity to
illustrate most of the issues discussed in this paper by the same company: To provide an
example of a “synergistic” corporation (section 3), how it has handled the dynamic
forces of diversified corporations (section 2), the organization of its technology base
(section 4), and its overall management of technology (section 5).
                                                
2 This term is borrowed from Goold, Campbell and Alexander (1994),
3 The case study is based on both a comprehensive written material on Danfoss and interviews especially
with vice-president Hans J.Pedersen and technology manager Vibeke Gustafsson (both Corporate
Technology and Research).10
2. DYNAMIC FORCES OF THE DIVERSIFIED CORPORATION
AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE TECHNOLOGY BASE
Since the work of Chandler (1962) the relationship between the strategy and the
organizational structure of diversified large corporations has been subject of intensive
research and debate. Research by among others Hill and Hoskisson (1987) and Goold
and Campbell (1987) have focused attention on the significance of different variants of
the M-form corporation. Others have argued that the increasing complexity in the wake
of globalization stimulates the emergence of new organizational network structures that
transcend the M-form (Prahalad and Doz, 1987, Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989, 1993,
Hedlund, 1994). From a competence-based perspective Prahalad and Hamel (1990) have
argued that the "strategic business unit" paradigm of the conventional M-form has
contributed to fragment the diversified corporation and undermine its core competences.
Recent discussions on the diversified corporation have focused on the coherence of the
corporation (Teece et al., 1994, Christensen and Foss, 1996, Foss and Christensen,
1997) and the "parenting" roles of the corporate headquarters (Chandler, 1994, Ferlie
and Pettigrew, 1996, Goold, Campbell and Alexander, 1994).
Below, I shall discuss the implications for the corporate technology base of some
generic tendencies in the strategy-structure dynamics of diversified corporations.
Generic forces of M-form corporations and their implications for the corporate
technology base
Since the transformation of such large American corporations as General Motors into
multidivisionals in the first half of this century it has gradually become conventional
wisdom that the decentralized multi-divisional (M-form) structure - as compared to the
functional (or unitary) structure (U-form) - provides a more adequate way of dealing
with administrative and operational problems of managing the multi-product
corporation.
Chandler (1962) and Williamson (1975) provided the economic rationale for this
conventional wisdom. They argued that headquarters in M-form firms should: 1) take11
responsibility for the overall strategic boundaries and direction of the corporation
(notably for acquisitions, divestures, and long-term investments), 2) monitor and audit
the affairs and performances of the divisions (which may require specialized corporate
staff), 3) reallocate resources generated by divisions on the basis of relative yields rather
than returning them to their source division, 4) use corporate incentives to promote
profit seeking behavior in the divisions (i.e. compensation schemes, promotion
incentives). On the other hand, divisional management should have full autonomy in
operational matters. According to Williamson such M-form structures are more likely to
favour goal pursuit and least-cost behavior in line with neoclassical maximization
behavior than are functionally organized corporations.
At least four overall forces have characterized the evolution of the large multi-business
corporation:
1.  Diversification into a) new business areas or product markets, and b) new
technologies.
2.  Increasing division of labour (for example with respect to organizing the
corporate technology base, or with respect to the focus of individual business
units or functional departments).
3.  Increasing organizational decentralization implying increasing scope for
autonomy at lower levels (i.e. the divisions, business units or profit centers),
not only in operational matters but also in strategic matters.
4.  Internationalization into still new geographical areas and globalization of
management and production structures.
While these forces have been underlying fundamental corporate growth dynamics
throughout this century  and only subject to temporary set-back, other forces show more
limited historical validity. The last decades’ increasing tendency for outsourcing or joint
knowledge accumulation with external parties seems to have reversed earlier tendencies
for vertical integration (Kaufman et al, 1996). However, the scope of this paper does not
allow a specific treatment of this issue.12
The four generic forces driving the evolution of the modern multi-business corporation
all contribute to increasing differentiation, diversity and complexity, and - to the extent
interdependencies exist between divisions and businesses in the corporation - they call
for measures to assure integration or coherence. This section focuses on the implications
of these tendencies - individually and as a whole - for the overall corporate approach to
R&D and technological innovation (the organization of the corporate technology base,
the profile of innovative assets and the focus of innovative efforts). However, while this
section does not take account of potential coordination mechanisms, the subsequent
section discusses M-form variants with coordinative planning mechanisms that seek to
exploit synergies and scope economies and counter the inherent fragmentation
tendencies of the "classical" M-form.
Ad. The dynamics of diversification.
Diversification has been the subject of systematic research by economists and strategy
researchers for many years. This research has mostly focused on product or business
diversification and the relationship between types of diversification (i.e. related versus
unrelated) and economic performance. There have only been few studies which adress
the dynamics of technology diversification, that is, the firm's expansion of its
technological asset base (particularly Pavitt et al., 1989, Granstrand and Sjölander, 1990
and 1993, Oskarsson, 1993). Technology diversification seems to have been even more
pronounced - at least within technology-intensive firms - than product diversification
(Pavitt et al., 1989), and at the product level technological upgrading is likely to lead to
increasing levels of R&D and an increasing number of required technologies for each
new product generation (Granstrand and Sjölander, 1990). This tendency for increasing
diversity of the technology base has been a central factor stimulating the rising mana-
gerial (as well as academic) attention to technology management and strategy in recent
years.
If technological diversification is exclusively linked to product-market strategies at
divisional or business unit levels, and no corporate or inter-divisional coordination is
taking place, the corporate technology base will tend to become not only increasingly13
complex, but also increasingly fragmented. This implies that the corporate technology
base becomes a collection of divional technology bases, and this collection does not
necessarily reflect the most adequate technology base for the corporation as a whole.
This may not pose any problems, if technological innovation either is not important for
the competition of the business units, or does not require large R&D investments.
However, in R&D-intensive corporations with inter-divisional complementarities,
fragmentation may pose serious problems in terms of economic inefficiencies such as
overlapping or underutilization of divisional competences (Coombs and Richards,
1993), and  poor coordination of interdependent technologies across divisions (Argyres,
1995).
Full divisional responsibility for technological development in a corporation may also
cause problems when discontinuities in terms of technological trajectories are required.
The path-dependent pattern of evolution and branching of technological development
underlie the notion of "technological trajectories" (Dosi, 1982; Nelson and Winter,
1977). Some technological trajectories evolve over time into many derived technologies
and provide a platform for many product applications and market opportunities, while
others are linked to specific applications in specific products and processes, and thus,
are dead-ends with respect to both technical and product market opportunities (Kim and
Kogut, 1996). If the individual divisions/business units do not have the financial
resources and competences to make the transition from increasingly obsolete or dead-
end trajectories to new prospective platform trajectories, substantial growth prospects
may be lost. This may call for a coordinated, corporate-level R&D and management of
technology effort.
Ad. Increasing division of labour
As technology-intensive firms grow larger and diversify into new product markets and
new technologies, the functional and managerial organization of the technology base
tend to become increasingly specialized. Product development tends to become
separated from manufacturing, long-term R&D tends to become seperated from short-
term development activities, R&D activities in one technical field tend to become14
separated from R&D in another field, etc. This increasing specialization is caused by the
dynamics of increasing returns to differentiation, but the process is also stimulated by
the "diversity dynamics" of diversification  (as mentioned above) and
internationalization (see below).
In large corporations operating in high-technology markets there is no longer one R&D
department that comprises the total corporate portfolio of innovative and technological
assets. Parallel to the broadening scope of the technology base (due to technology
diversification) the different assets and associated activities become specialized in
increasingly narrow sub-categories of technical fields and functions, and these different
parts of the technology base are spread all over the corporation, from science
laboratories to product development, product customization, engineering, design and
manufacturing support departments (or individuals/groups) in product divisions,
subsidiaries, or joint ventures. This process of increasing division of labour increases
compartmentalization, cultural segregation and, eventually, political rivalry over
resources between various parts of the corporate technology base and imposes
increasing requirements on coordination.
Hitatchi Ltd provides a case of illustration. As one of the world's leading electronic
companies Hitatchi is spending around 5 billion dollars on R&D, more than any other
company in the world. The corporation has 33 R&D laboratories, nine of which are
directly under the corporate headquarters, two are located in Europe, and two others in
the U.S. These laboratories can be classified in six categories (Bowonder & Miyake,
1994, p.66):
·  Laboratories with short-term research focus for quick commercialization of
innovations originating from various product groups (Central Research Labs).
·  Specific divisional R&D laboratories dealing with short-time horizon
innovation projects (Semiconductor Design and Development Centre).
·  Highly specialized laboratories with core competence as the focus (i.e.VLSI
Lab).15
·  Laboratories with multi-disciplinary expertise with focus on generic
competence in one application segment (for example, Space Systems Labs).
·  Laboratories that specifically focus on long-term projects in emerging
technologies (for example, Advanced Research Lab).
·  Laboratories which act as interfaces for new projects, user-supplier interaction,
and technology scanning (for example, System Development Lab).
In Hitatchi different sorts of coordination and integration measures is in work to assure
overall coherence in R&D activities. However, if there were no such countervailing
coordination mechanisms this division of labour dynamic would tend to promote a
fragmented competence building at the level of the specialized competence categories
and the individual business units and departments. Paradoxically, while this
specialization process reflects the accumulation of knowledge and capabilities, the same
process may contribute to the undermining of core competences (and corporate
coherence) and make it difficult to build synergies between different assets (Prahalad
and Hamel, 1990).
Ad. Decentralization
The processes of diversification and increasing division of labour (and
internationalization, see below) has made large multibusiness corporations so complex
that centralized planning has given way to delegation and decentralization to lower
organizational levels. But decentralization is also a consequence of the principles of
economic organization (as formulated by Williamson, 1975) for controlling the
efficiency of divisions, and achieving efficient allocation of capital resources: First, the
separation of strategic and operating functions, secondly, the implementation of
functional autonomy of divisions, and thirdly, the establishing of a top-down financial
control of divisional profit performance.16
Decentralization in the form of divisionalization
4 has also involved decentralization of
R&D and management of technology in large diversified corporations (Coombs and
Richards, 1993, Coombs, 1996, Rubenstein, 1989, Whittington, 1990, National Science
Board, 1992). Loescher (1984) argues that the tendency for tight, top-down financial
control may lead to risk-avoidance by divisional managers. Hill (1985) hypothizes that
M-form efficiency focus is linked to short-termism and low R&D commitment, that is,
"static efficiency" (or operational efficiency and exploitation of existing competences
and resources) at the expense of "dynamic efficiency" (or innovative and explorative
efforts that provide opportunities for value creation at the longer term). In an
authoritative study of industrial R&D in the U.S. it is concluded that “In large
corporations, efforts is shifting away from central laboratories toward division-level
effort with greater emphasis on risk minimization to meet the needs of today’s
customers; emphasis is also shifting away from new markets toward existing markets”
(National Science Board, 1992, iii). The advantages of divisionalization are that it
stimulates stronger market orientation, better inter-functional integration between R&D,
marketing, manufacturing, etc. (Coombs, 1996) and a focus on incremental innovation.
In short, the decentralization dynamics tend to promote both short-termism in innovative
efforts and a strong, but risk-averse, market-orientation.
Ad. internationalization and globalization
The dynamics of internationalization have implied a need for the corporation to be
present and build relationships in an increasing number of countries or regions. This
presence can take very different forms, among others: The establishment of foreign sales
agencies to stimulate export-based market positions; the establishment of  foreign
manufacturing subsidiaries that can benefit from low labour and transport costs, tariff
advantages, or national manufacturing competences; intergration of national
manufacturing subsidiaries into national and transnational regional production systems
and networks (Ernst, 1996); or the building of R&D centres outside the mother-country
of the corporation.
                                                
4 The term divisionalization here refers to decentralization of some previously centrally managed activities
to either product divisions or more decentral levels (business units or profit centres within the business17
Like business diversification, internationalization contributes to increase complexity in
managing the corporation: Balancing the difficult and ever-changing trade-off between
global coordination and concern for local/national requirements
5.
While the international dispersion of corporate manufacturing facilities to a large extent
reflects different national factor market endowments of relevance for manufacturing
(including logistics) costs and quality, the international distribution of facilities for the
corporation’s technical research and innovation cannot be reduced to "factor market"
and cost concerns. Internationalization of industrial R&D is a more recent phenomenon
and has not progressed as far as the internationalization of corporate manufacturing
(Granstrand, Håkanson and Sjölander, 1993). Granstrand and his colleagues find that the
forces working for geographical decentralization to some extent is retarded due to
countervaling forces in favour of centralization (such as scale economies in R&D, need
to protect technical know how from leaking, wish to minimize costs of coordination,
historical path-dependency). The forces favouring geographical decentralization may
either be associated with the objective of better serving foreign national markets or
enhancing the efficiency of R&D. With respect to the former objective, national R&D
laboratories may be established to provide product differentiation for specific national
requirements. Sometimes national facilities originally set-up to provide technical
support services for national manufacturing subsidiaries, gradually evolve into proper
product and process development departments focusing on adaptation of products and
processes to local circumstances or assuring "design for manufacturability". With
respect to the objective of enhancing R&D efficiency, foreign national R&D may also
be involved in the more profound development of new technological capabilities. This
objective is reflected in two categories of foreign R&D units. First, the R&D of foreign
acquisitions, in which the R&D competences may constitute the primary reason for the
acquisition. Secondly, the "monitoring R&D unit" that is set up with the primary
objective of "tapping into" a foreign scientific infrastructure (Granstrand et al, 1993, p.
                                                                                                                                              
units).
5 The so-called multi-domestic matrix organization of for example ABB is a reflection of the need to
balance this trade-off (Taylor, 1991, Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1993).18
416f.). Moreover,  one or more foreign subsidiaries may evolve into a strategic centre
for the corporation or for a group within the corporation within a certain product area or
function (Forsgren et al, 1991).  If such foreign centres arise, the overall power-structure
of the corporation may change from a hierarchic centre-periphery structure into a multi-
centre structure. Forsgren et al (1991) make a distinction between four categories of
such centres:
 
·  production centre (developing products of its own, and manufacturing and selling
this product to several countries).
·  marketing or purchasing centre (having full responsibility for marketing or
purchasing of the products within a business area encompassing several countries).
·  Research centre (independently carrying out R&D aiming at fulfilling the
requirements of several other units in the corporation.
·  Management centre (division with management stationed abroad).
The emergence of production centres (with own product development), research centres
and management centres may undermine the traditional authority of the corporate lab
and give rise not only to downsizing of central R&D but also to a strategic proliferation
of R&D-efforts that is not the result of corporate strategic intent nor subject of control
from the level of the headquarters.
Implications for the corporate technology base
Taken together, the four tendencies provide incentives for changes in innovative efforts
and innovative competence profiles. Hoskisson and Hitt (1988) provide moderate
(although not statistically significant) support for the hypothesis that M-form firms
invest relatively less in R&D than functionally organized (U-form) firms. However,
rather than an overall downgrading of R&D, the decentralized M-form may induce
incentives for changes in the innovative asset profile that will tend to 1) fragment or
weaken the internal coherence of the corporate technology base (implying a potential
failure to explore and exploit cross-divisional synergies, as well as risk of duplication of
innovative efforts), 2) favour short-termism and incrementalism in innovative efforts19
such as line extensions, and suppress more radical innovation, thus moving the balance
between incremental and explorative efforts in favour of the former. Moreover, this
move towards incrementalism may favour process, product and design innovative
competences relative to science-based competences (Christensen, 1995, 1996b). Such
changing balance of the innovative competence profile may underlie the tendencies to
reduce the role and autonomy of central science laboratories and to induce a stronger
"internal market mechanism", that is, guiding and funding from divisional levels (see
section 4).
In sum, when the dominant dynamics of the corporation are based on strategies and
trajectories at divisional and national levels rather than strategies and visions at
corporate level, the outcome is likely to be increasing inter-divisional and corporate-
wide fragmentation of the corporate technology base despite possibly increasing intra-
divisional coherence. So far, this discussion has taken the conventional M-form as
given. In this form divisional autonomy in operational and functional matters is
considered decisive, since top management intervention in these matters will reduce
efficiency by weakening incentives. However, this focus on incentives has lead to a
theoretical neglect of coordination issues in the multibusiness firm. M-form theory has
overlooked, as Argyres (1995) maintains, "...the condition of complementarity, under
which intervention may produce coordination gains which offset these incentive losses".
Today most diversified firms are multidivisionals (Hill and Pickering, 1986). However,
as Hill and Hoskisson (1987) and Goold and Campbell (1987) have pointed out, M-form
structures are not homogeneous, and many M-form firms vary in substantial ways from
the ideal form suggested by Williamson.
3. VARIANTS OF THE M-FORM AND THE MANAGEMENT OF
THE CORPORATE TECHNOLOGY BASE
Firms may become multi-product companies through three main strategies: vertical
integration, related diversification, and unrelated diversification. Each of these strategies
is associated with a specific type of economic objective (Hill and Hoskisson, 1987):20
Vertical integration strategies seek to exploit "vertical economies" that arise from scale
or integration economies, from increase in control over resources or outlets, or from
elimination of the transaction costs of using the market. Related diversification
strategies seek to benefit from "synergistic economies" (synergies or scope economies
between resources and competences). Finally, unrelated diversification strategies seek to
exploit financial economies (by reducing risk, applying portfolio management, and
overcoming external capital market failures).
To each of these three strategies corresponds a set of planning and control arrangements
within the basic M-form framework (Hill and Hoskisson, 1987, p.333): The "pure" M-
form is consistent with a strategy of unrelated diversification in order to realize financial
economies, but not consistent with either vertical integration or related diversification
strategies. Both of these latter strategies require a degree of central coordination and
interdivisional cooperation. Moreover, Hill and Hoskisson maintain that it is difficult
for a firm to go for both financial economies on the one hand, and synergistic or vertical
economies on the other, while they find similarities between the systems necessary to
realize vertical and synergistic economies and, thus, suggest that these are more
compatible (Hill and Hoskisson, 1987, p. 335).
If we now introduce the corporate technology base perspective, it seems obvious that the
"pure" M-form (to realize a strategy of financial economies) will tend to "balkanize" the
corporate technology base along the lines discussed in section 2. This may not cause any
problems as long as the technology base consists of generic technologies that are not
proprietary to the firm and do not contain strong systemic features. In contrast, the
"synergistic" M-form structures (to realize vertical or synergistic economies) are more
likely to promote coherence both in terms of relatedness of the business fields of the
corporation (as suggested by Teece et al., 1994) and in terms of the couplings and
synergies between different parts of the corporate technology base (Christensen, 1997) -
to the extent that technology base synergies come to the attention of the corporate
strategy agenda.21
Based on case-studies of 16 British diversified corporations, Goold and Campbell
(1987) find three major types of management styles used by senior management at
corporate headquarters: Strategic planning, strategic control, and financial control.
These management styles are defined in terms of two dimensions of the centre's
influence, planning influence and control influence. Planning influence concerns the
centre's contribution to the strategy process in the business units. Control influence
concerns the centre's way of reacting to results achieved. Strategic planning corporations
have a high level of central planning influence, while the centre's control influence is
flexible and focused more on strategic targets than on annual budgets. Strategic control
corporations exert a more moderate level of planning influence, while control measures
are stricter and cover both financial and strategic targets. Financial control companies
have a low level of central planning influence, while the centre focuses on tight financial
control.
In a recent paper Chandler (1994) reviews both his own and Goold and Campbell's work
on the functions of headquarters in multibusiness companies. Like Goold and Campbell
he finds that strategic planning and strategic control companies are generally smaller
and less diversified than financial control companies. While strategic planning and
strategic control companies tend to operate in relatively high-technology industries, have
relatively large R&D departments, and exploit interbusiness and interdivisional
opportunities, financial control companies tend to operate in service industries and in
industries involving relatively inexpensive production facilities and small R&D
expenditures. Moreover, financial control companies show a low level of interbusiness
and interdivisional interdependencies.
Combining the classifications of Hill and Hoskisson (1987) and Goold and Campbell
(1987) some tentative implications concerning the management of the corporate
technology base may be drawn. The "pure" M-form structure may favour unrelated
diversification and the exploitation of financial economies. This corresponds to the
financial control type of corporations which are mostly prevalent in relatively low-
technology areas, and subsequently no efforts, whatsoever, are mobilized to manage the22
overall corporate technology base. On the other hand corporations which pursue
strategies of related diversification or vertical integration in order to exploit synergistic
or vertical economies will tend to use some kind of either strategic planning or strategic
control style which may very well include some level of centralized R&D as well as
efforts to promote dynamic coherence of the corporate technology base. It is, however,
likely that the problems of short-termism in innovative efforts and fragmentation of the
corporate technology base, are not exclusively associated with the "pure" M-form, but
are also present or inherently creeping into the more "synergistic" M-form corporations
as they diversify into still new business areas and the technology base grows more
complex
6
Danfoss - a "synergistic" M-form corporation
7
Since its establishment in 1933 Danfoss has been one of the most successful Danish
manufacturing companies. Every single year since 1933 Danfoss has shown a positive
profit. In 1995 Danfoss reached a turnover of around $2 billion and had about 17.000
employees. The company manufactures thousands of different products and product
models within 13 broader product lines (particularly mechatronical products for
industrial markets), among others thermostats for cooling and freezing equipment,
comfort automatics (products for temperature control, radiator thermostats, etc.),
cooling and airconditioning automatics, hydraulic components and industrial
instrumentation (i.e. electronic flow meters).
Most of the Danfoss products have one thing in common: They are located in technical
equipment and systems to control dynamic processes. Danfoss has global market
leadership within several of its product areas (e.g. some types of hydraulic equipment,
intelligent cooling systems, radiator thermostats, non-CFC compressors and thermostats
for refrigerators and freezers).
                                                
6 Coombs and Richards (1991 a+b) provide some illustrative evidence on the complexity of promoting
coherence of the technology base in large diversified companies.
7 The content of this section and subsequent parts on Danfoss is based on Iversen and Christensen (1996),
an subsequent interview with vice-president Hans Jørgen Pedersen (Corporate Technology and
Research).23
In the early 1970's Danfoss transformed its organization from a higly centralized U-form
company to a more decentralized M-form company. The number of product divisions
has grown from four in 1971 to ten today. Moreover, two sales divisions are responsible
for sales in different geographical regions. In april 1996 the product divisions became
part of one of three new divisional groups (product families): Refrigeration Controls,
Heating Controls and Motion Controls. This organizational restructuring also implied
that the four general managers were not any longer also divisional managers - a double
task that tended to overload the managers in question. Thus, one purpose was to release
managerial capacity in the organization; another purpose was to focus synergy attention
to inter-divisional relations within the product family groups.
The growth of Danfoss has been based on the continuously launching of new or
improved products and expansion into still new geographic markets and customer
segments. The nearly persistent success of Danfoss can to a large extent be explained by
its ability to identify and exploit new market opportunities through innovative
application and combination of different assets in the corporate technology base and
through the ability (and luck) to build new technological competences that mesh well
with the existing ones and provide new commercial opportunities. Scale economies,
effective and high-quality manufacturing and "design for manufacturability" are critical
competitive advantages of Danfoss' most important products - certainly of the most
successfull of them all: the radiator thermostat. Growth has from the end of the 1930s
and up until the mid 1970s been focused on internally generated growth based on mass
production. Not until the 1980s did Danfoss begin to expand through acquisitions, and
in the 1990s acquisitions have become a vital part of Danfoss' strategy for growth and
globalization. In Europe acquisition options are sought among firms with products that
are complementary to Danfoss products. In the rest of the world Danfoss is seeking to
acquire firms not only for the sake of their products but also their distribution system.
Generally acquisitions have primarily been made to strengthen market positions and not
acquire critical R&D capabilities.24
Danfoss has been marked by all the generic forces discussed in section 2.
The dynamics of diversification has involved both product market diversification and
technology diversification.  Danfoss started out in 1933 with two types of valves for
refrigerating plants. Up until 1940 the product portfolio was added 38 new product, all
related to refrigerating or cold storage plants. During World War II another 37 products
were added. From the beginning of the 1950s the rate of new product introductions was
further increased, and by the end of the 1960s the product portfolio consisted of about
300 products (Boje & johansen, 1994). There are no comparable
figures accessible concerning the development during the last decades, but it seems fair
to suggest that there has not been a slow-down in the rate of new product launching.
From the initial focus on valves for refrigerating plants, new products came to include
automatics equipment for stoking, heating, compressed-air, and water supply plants. In
the 1950s Danfoss started manufacturing compressors and radiatorthermostats; in the
1960s and 1970s Danfoss introduced different types of hydraulic components, electronic
frequency controls and flow meters. During the 1980s and 1990s  Danfoss has focused
on developing improved versions of existing products, offering new products for
existing customers, introducing products with reduced environmental effects, and
delivering complete systems (for instance for complex heating regulation) that integrates
electronics and precision mechanics.
Technology diversification has been just as significant as product market diversification.
Thus, for example the primarily mechanical engineering base of the early Danfoss era
has been supplemented by electronics and software  capabilities since the 1950s
8.
Capabilities in hydraulics have become a decisive asset in the technology base from the
                                                
8 The founder of Danfoss, Mads Clausen, hired an electronics engineer in 1953 and in the beginning of the
60s the newly established Danfoss Electronics manufactured customized electrical rectifiers. When this
production stopped in 1965 due to poor commercial results the department was turned into a Technical
Research Center with 20 employees. This center was given the task to identify a promising area for
Danfoss within electronics. Out of this searching and R&D effort grew the frequency control - the first
successfull electronics product in Danfoss. The frequency control provides continuous regulation of
alternating-current motors, and today Danfoss is among the international leaders within the field.
Electronics is, however, not only linked to this specific field within Danfoss but has gradually diffused
into most of the product lines and been aligned with mechanical engineering, hydraulics and other
technical fields of expertise in Danfoss.25
1960's and onwards
9. Other more specific technical capabilities (i.e. stainless steel
technology, computational fluid dynamics) have been developed in the context of the
expanding product portfolio.
Also the dynamics of increasing division of labour and decentralization have been very
profound in Danfoss with respect to the organization and specialization of the
technology base. While all the company’s R&D assets were centralized in the central
R&D lab, Corporate Technology and Research (CTR) until the beginning of the 1970s,
divisionalization implied a gradual build-up of product and process development
activities within the increasing number of divisions. In other words, divisionalization led
to a dispersion of R&D, and a division of labour between the longer term R&D-
activities to build fundamental technological competences in CTR and the shorter term
development activities in the divisions. CTR also expanded its capacity to provide
technical and procedural assistance to the divisions with respect to for instance problems
in product development. Thus, like most other corporate R&D functions, CTR gradually
came to comprise the two broad strategic purposes that Graham (1985) has identified as
follows: “[O]ne motivated by relatively short-term technical needs that are in some
sense generic to multiple parts of the corporation, the other motivated by the desire to
insulate some R&D activity from day-to-day operating concerns and to focus it on long-
term corporate needs ouside the current scope of any operating divisions” (p. 181).
Moreover, in the 1980s and 90s CTR also developed competence in overall
management of technology (see section 5). Decentralization of R&D-efforts were
further stimulated when CTR was formally shut down in 1996 (for further elaboration
on the activities in and the closure of CTR, see section 4).
With respect to internationalization Danfoss has a sales presence in more than 100
countries, sales agencies in 35 countries and manufacturing facilities in 11 countries. As
                                                
9 This asset was also initiated by the founder of Danfoss as he in 1959 decided to go into partnership
production of harvester threshers (combines) - a quite unrelated product market diversification. The
production was stopped in 1962 after significant loss. However, Danfoss continued to produce hydraulic
components for combines and gradually hydraulic equipment became one of the most important product
areas and hydraulics a high-level capability area in Danfoss.26
mentioned earlier acquisitions have primarily been made to strengthen market positions,
not to acquire critical technologies. While increasing product development activities
take place in some of the foreign subsidiaries (for example development of compressors
for refrigerators  and freezers in Mexico and large frequency transformers in U.S.A.), so
far no fundamental technology development takes place in the foreign subsidiaries.
Danfoss has primarily become a multi-product company by pursuing a strategy of
related diversification rather than unrelated diversification or vertical integration, even if
the two latter also to some extent have been been followed, especially in the early
history of Danfoss. The attempts to exploit "synergistic economies" through some
degree of central coordination and inter-divisional cooperation have been significant
even if decentralization  has also implied tendencies for divisional autonomy and
corporate fragmentation. In the terminology of Goold and Campbel (1987) Danfoss'
planning and control systems seem more in accordance with the strategic control type
than with both the financial control type and the strategic planning type, although there
are some elements that bring Danfoss closer to the latter. This is also reflected in the
organization of the corporate technology base to which I shall return in section 4 and 5.
The following sections will only deal with the more "synergistic", technology-intensive
M-form corporations and penetrate somewhat deeper into the role of the central R&D
lab and the potential role for management of the corporate technology base in a context
of predomiantly decentral R&D.
4. THE CHANGING ORGANIZATION OF THE CENTRAL R&D
LAB
 The conventional role of the central R&D laboratory is to provide long-term research
and development of new technological capabilities and trajectories that may feed into
new ventures, product or process development either within the central lab itself or in
engineering, manufacturing or product development departments of divisions and
business units.27
From World War II and the following decades the large central laboratory emerged as
the leading institution for industrial R&D (Whittington, 1990). Some of the main
advantages of centralized R&D (organizationally as well as geographically) can be
summarized as follows:
·  Concentration of R&D within a single organization on the same location
facilitates coordination of projects and reduces the risk of redundancies (Twiss,
1992).
·  Integration of multidisciplinary and tacit knowledge is a decisive part of most
technological innovation, and this integration tends to be facilitated by physical
proximity (Patel and Pavitt, 1991)
·  R&D is subject to economies of scale: One single laboratory is more likely than
a diversity of small R&D departments to achieve "critical mass", attract
talented engineers, and mobilize resources for complex R&D problems.
·  By locating R&D personel in laboratories distant from operational activities
they can concentrate on long-term R&D and avoid getting distracted from daily
operational problems (Twiss, 1992).
Some of these advantages, however, have not materialized in practice or have become
less obvious as some typical weaknesses associated with centralized R&D have become
visible in the context of the growing complexity of the diversified corporation. To the
extent that product divisions become involved in innovative activities themselves,
coordination and communication problems may evolve between central R&D and
divisional R&D
10. To the extent that the central R&D lab has authority to interfere in
divisional R&D affairs, incentive problems may easily occur at divisional levels. As
divisions grow larger, divisional R&D may surmount the "critical mass" treshold for
effective R&D and make one of the basic rationales for central R&D, economies of
                                                
10 As divisions grow larger the same kind of coordination problems may be reproduced between divisional
R&D centres and innovative activities in business units and subsidiaries which refer to the division in
question.28
scale, less adequate
11. Thus, as divisions grow larger (and more autonomous) and as the
corporation grows more diversified (and increasingly difficult to assist from central
R&D) the central R&D lab tends to become decoupled - not only from the divisions'
operational affairs, but also from their innovative activities. This may result in 1) a bad
fit between the supply of "high brow" knowledge from the lab and the practical
requirements of the business units, 2) poor technology transfer mechanisms due to the
distance in skills and priorities between the two parties, and 3) undermining of the
legitimacy and authority of the central lab from the perspective of the increasingly
powerful divisions. Thus, while isolation from the operating divisions originally was an
advantage, it has tended to become a disadvantage.
A typical way of handling this problem in the 1970s and 1980s was to increase
divisional power over the central R&D implying that divisional managers became
directly involved in the steering committees of central labs, and that a larger share of
central R&D should be ordered and financed by the divisions. This has generally
provided a better link between the central and divisional R&D efforts. However, in
many cases the transmission of funding and power from corporate to divisional level has
lead directly to downsizing of central R&D and/or creeping short-termism in the form of
smaller ad hoc projects at the cost of visionary long-term projects. These changes in the
economic organization of the central R&D have been accompanied by a change in the
terms of cooperation: Increasingly the "transfer logic" implying that new discoveries
were "thrown over the wall" to the design and engineering departments has been
replaced by a "teamworking logic" in which the corporate lab is part of teams operating
on conditions that are very much specified at the level of the business unit (Edelheit,
1995).
Few companies seem to have gone so far as Siemens - the German electrical engineering
group  - in putting the idea of an internal market for R&D into practice (Wagstyl, 1996).
                                                
11 Eventually one division’s or subsidiary’s R&D may evolve into a strategic research centre for the whole
or larger parts of the corporation (Forsgren et al, 1991), and this upcoming research centre may be
viewed as a new central lab (outside the domaine of the headquarters) that can either substitute the
“old” central lab or threathen its traditionel position.29
Siemens has - next to Hitatchi - the world's largest corporate R&D budget (around $4,8
billion)
12. Until 1994 Siemens' central laboratories secured two-thirds of their finance
from the group headquarters, which charged the money as a "tax" on the divisions. The
rest was funded directly from the divisions or from government research programmes.
The divisions resented paying this "tax", and central funding was reduced to one-third,
and the amount contributed directly by divisions was increased to one-half. Moreover,
the divisions were given the freedom to contract their R&D to outside organizations.
Thus, the divisions are not obliged to use the services of the central laboratories. The
laboratories not only had to orient their work more directly to the needs of their
customers in the divisions. They also had to advertise their services using lectures and
demonstrations. "The "buyers" from the operating divisions choose the programmes they
want to fund and then negotiate the details, including price, with the laboratory
managers (Wagstyl, 1996).
The organization of R&D in Danfoss
The changing organization of R&D in Danfoss seems quite typical of the described
tendencies in the evolution of R&D in the multi-divisional corporation (Iversen &
Christensen, 1996). In the 1960s Danfoss was a quickly growing functionally organized
company with a conventional R&D lab, Corporate Technology and Research (CTR).
However, up through the 1970s the newly established and rapidly expanding product
divisions gained growing control over resource allocation decisions in CTR. This
resulted in increasing numbers of small projects without much coherence and overall
guidance. In the 1980s, under the direction of Jørgen M. Clausen, son of the founder of
Danfoss, CTR regained significant autonomy and began to focus on a more limited
number of strategic R&D and venturing projects. Gradually the product divisions grew
so large that they increasingly became capable of managing their own R&D within their
respective business domains, including - to some extent  - venture projects which
involve prospects for product market diversification. This resulted in a substantial
transformation of CTR from a R&D lab to a centre for corporate technology
                                                
12 Some 44,800 people work in R&D in Siemens. Far the most of these work in the operating divisions, 
and about 1,700 are assigned to the central laboratories where the mainpart of the longer-range research30
management that transcended the traditional role of the corporate R&D lab, even if
R&D still played an important role. While most of R&D in Danfoss was carried out in
CTR in 1960's and early 70's the CTR-based R&D in the early and mid 1990s only
covered about 20% of total R&D in Danfoss. By then around one fourth of total costs in
CTR was financed by the divisions.
Other activities than R&D-projects successively came to play a relatively increasing role
within CTR: Technical service (consultants providing specific technical assistance for
the divisions), the management of patents, standardization and certification activities,
quality control, and management of technology across the corporation (the latter of
which will be discussed in section 5).
In 1996 the radical decision was taken to close down CTR that by then had 150
employees. This was done to spur divisional management to take full responsibility for
R&D and to more thoroughly integrate technology and business strategies.The top
management felt that the existence of CTR tended to become an excuse for not building
sufficient technological competences at divisional levels. Technical service or
consulting and standardization/certification activities were moved to a new Central
Service department that is owned by the divisions. Some R&D-projects and the quality
control activities have been moved from CTR to the divisions. The patent unit, some
R&D and venture projects, and the management of technology activities are carried on
at corporate level under the direction of the former CTR manager, Hans Jørgen
Pedersen.
These restructurations have not been implemented with the intention to downsize
overall R&D investments. The objective is to create a stronger bottom-up commitment
to R&D in which the location of ownership and responsibility is considered af key issue.
Corporate management is willing to co-sponsor venture and R&D activities if the
proposals a) are backed up by at least two divisions, b) have a long-term explorative
perspective, and c) do not have a natural home base within one of the divisions.
                                                                                                                                              
takes place (Wagstyl, 1996).31
In the subsequent section I shall explore the potential roles of corporate technology
management and provide further illustration from the Danfoss case.
5. THE ROLE OF CORPORATE MANAGEMENT OF
TECHNOLOGY IN PURSING DYNAMIC COHERENCE
While the conventional central R&D lab has come under severe strain as the corporation
has diversified and divisional R&D has been strengthened, there seems to be a growing
demand for corporate-level management of technology. However, this does not
necessarily imply a reversal of the general tendency to decentralize innovative efforts. A
"back to centralism" in the management of the corporate technology base could easily
impose significant bureaucratic costs and incentive problems that could induce
opportunistic behavior in a context of assymetric information. This could undermine the
advantages that the decentralized M-form has demonstrated with respect to the
organization and functions of the technology base:
·  A stronger market-orientation (including responsiveness to national or local
requirements) in technological development and innovative efforts.
·  Less bureaucracy and fewer vertical levels involved in decisions concerning the
allocation of R&D resources between alternative projects.
·  Greater motivation and entrepreneurial spirit as a consequence of a situation in
which local operations and initiatives are not constantly disturbed or overruled
from higher levels.
·  Better potential for intimate inter-functional arrangements between R&D,
marketing and other functional areas in the pursuit of product or process
development (Coombs, 1996).
What is called for, is a balanced perspective on corporate management of technology, in
which there is still a role to play at the corporate level, even if the larger part of R&D
and the managagement of technology take place at the more decentral levels and even in
collaboration with external parties. This implies that the "pure" M-form has to be32
counterbalanced by some elements of central coordination and inter-divisional
cooperation, and generally by loosening the rigidity of organizational structures and
creating elements of flexibility and variety in exploring opportunities. Pavitt (1991)
argues that an essential dimension of successful large firms’ managerial competence is
the ability to combine the differentiated technological competencies into effective units
for identifying and developing innovations.
This section discusses the options for managing the corporate technology base in
technology-intensive corporations with the purpose of increasing dynamic corporate
coherence.
Pursuing dynamic coherence of the corporate technology base
Dynamic corporate coherence is defined as the corporate capacity to exploit and explore
synergies from a diversity of capabilities, competences and other resources (Christensen
and Foss, 1996). In high technology corporations coherence of the corporate technology
base is a critical aspect of the overall corporate coherence
13.
The coherence of the technology base signifies the degree of coordination and interrela-
tedness within the technology base between the different technological and innovative
capabilities. A high level of coherence reflects a technology base comprising a diverse
portfolio of innovative competences, and characterized by the exploitation and
exploration of a high level of communication, knowledge exchange, synergy and
coordination in innovative efforts - not only in horizontal relations (between divisions
and business units) but also in vertical relations (between the corporate centre of R&D
and technology management and divisional innovative efforts), as well as in external
relations.
                                                
13 The notion of coherence of the technology base may apply to three dimensions as discussed in
Christensen (1997): 1. The external coherence (or "fit") reflects the degree to which the competences
constituting the technology base match the requirements of the competition. 2. The contextual
coherence reflects correspondence between the technology base and the broader firm or corporate
context (the complementary assets, the operational and infrastructural firm context, the company's33
Below I shall briefly discuss the following objectives of a corporate centre of technology
management:
1.  Providing overall strategic guidance of the corporate technology base and
innovative efforts.
2.  Providing “parenting value” to the divisions and business units in their
innovative efforts.
3.  Assuring a proper balance and alignment between short-term, incremental
innovative efforts (exploitation) and long-term explorative efforts.
4.  Increasing horizontal technology transfer and sharing, as well as synergy and
coordination in research and technological innovation between divisions,
business units, and subsidiaries.
These objectives reflect different (although overlapping) dimensions of pursuing
dynamic coherence of the corporate technology base. Strengthening the corporate
coherence of the technology base should not, of course, be the only strategic concern for
corporate management in diversified corporations. But it should certainly be of central
concern to the corporation that seeks synergistic and vertical economies.
Ad. 1. Providing overall strategic guidance
One overall objective for the corporate management of technology would be the
provision of long-term perspectives and guidelines for the rate and direction of the
corporate technology base as well as for the overall strategic direction of the
corporation.
In their study of 24 diversified companies with significant R&D performance, Coombs
and Richards (1993) found..."that some companies are creating small units at the centre
of the corporate structure (which may or may not be within the R&D function), the
                                                                                                                                              
strategy and culture). 3. The local coherence signifies the degree to which there are interdependencies
and synergies between different parts of the technology base. This section exclusively deals with this
latter dimension of coherence of the technology base.34
purposes of which include the following:
·  “analyzing the structure of the overall technology portfolio;
·  ensuring that a technological competence in one business is known to and
available to other potential user businesses in the group;
·  identifying technical competencies which straddle businesses, in order to take
steps to strengthen them through 'horizontal' organizational links and through
small special budgets;
·  considering the overall technology portfolio and injecting an appreciation of
this portfolio into the broader strategic management processes of the company"
(p.390).
Thus, such a corporate centre of strategic technology management could be a vital
vehicle in promoting a coherent technology base "from above": A forum for reflection,
coordination and strategic guidance on the one hand, and a window for making the
different facets of the corporate technology base visible and accessible for divisons and
business units on the other hand. These roles can only be performed effectively if a close
and ongoing dialogue exists between the centre and the divisions and business units.
Ad. 2. Providing direct "parenting value" to the business units
While the overall strategic guidance role - if successful - provides "parenting value" of
an indirect kind, direct "parenting value" implies the provision of specific inputs to the
value generating processes in the divisions and business units. The role of the
conventional R&D lab was in fact to supply R&D-inputs into the product and process
development projects of the business units. As outlined in section 4 this role has been
increasingly difficult to realize in the context of the isolated lab in the ivory tower and
the growing complexity of the divional setting. The objective to improve the direct
parenting value of the central lab underlies the increasing efforts in diversified
corporations to tie the central lab in to the direct interests of the divisions by a)
increasing divisional funding of the lab, b) increasing divisional political influence on
resource allocation in the lab, and c) by replacing the "transfer logic" by a "teamwork
logic" (cf. section 4),35
It should be added, however, that central R&D and technology management may not
only produce technical knowledge but also - and perhaps increasingly so - inputs to the
development of organizational or managerial competences (such as procedures and
standards for project management, quality management or user-producer relations in
product development).
Ad. 3. Assuring a balance and alignment between exploitation and exploration
Balancing the trade-off between the reproductive and explorative dimensions of the
technology base is a highly complex task in the large diversified corporation. Within the
conventional conception of the large corporation with a central lab this balance was
handled by a simple division of labour: The lab was responsible for the explorative
efforts, while the operating divisions were responsible for the efficient exploitation and
commercialization of inventions and discoveries generated in the lab.
Centralized R&D may play a role in countervailing the tendency in the wake of
decentralization and internationalization towards compromising exploration and risky
R&D investments in favour of exploitation (and short-termism). Thus, some degree of
centralized control over and impetus in the strategic development of the technology base
may be required to assure a coherence of the corporate technology base that balance the
trade-off between short-term incremental and longer-term explorative efforts.
This objective may be difficult to reach if the R&D lab is exclusively locked-in to serve
the immidiate requirements of the divisions. The answer is not, however, to go back to
the "ivory tower" model of the lab; this model may very well assure a remarkable
exploratory capacity, but it does not assure a fit between the exploratory outputs and the
operational competences of the divisions. A very critical aspect of the balance between
exploration and exploitation is that the new technologies developed can be aligned with
the "old" operating technologies, and that requires a cooperative relation between the lab36
and the divisions and a recognition that sometimes explorative efforts that go beyond
the scope of the individual divisions is necessary
14.
Ad. 4. Strengthening horizontal linkages and coordination
Strengthening horizontal linkages and coordination seems an increasingly important,
although higly difficult task for diversified corporations in which fragmentation of the
corporate technology base is creeping in.
Two types of horizontal issues should be adressed: First, providing channels and
incentives for inter-divisional communication, asset sharing and transfer; secondly,
providing means to assure inter-divisional coordination when technological
interdependencies exist.
Promoting inter-divisional communication and exchange would involve both some
channels (an infrastructure) and some incentives. Examples of channels could be a)
coordination groups and committees that cut across the interest of individual businesses
and divisions; b) rotation programs among divisions for the younger personnel; c) cross-
divisional project teams for diffusing core competencies and for loosing the bonds that
might tie an individual to one business (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990, p. 91), d)
implementing the "merchandiser" concept (Collinson, 1993) as developed by Sony
15.
Moreover, an efficient and sophisticated corporate-wide IT infrastructure is a basic
precondition for any effort to expand inter-divisional communication.
Incentives are probably more difficult to assure than channels. Moreover, if incentives
for inter-divisional exchange are weak, channels however sophisticated and formalized)
will not be used effectively. While the economic incentives for divisional management
in the conventional M-form is focused exclusively on the economic performance of the
individual division, incentives in the synergy-oriented corporation should (also)
                                                
14 Barpal (1990) illustrates how Westinghouse has organized its central R&D in order not only to assure
direct parenting value to the divisions, but also to assure proper concern for explorative efforts.
15 “Merchandisers” are individuals with a cross-divisional perspective. They are freed from routine tasks
and given the authority to act as internal entrepreneurs.37
emphasize inter-divisional cooperation (for example, profit bonus for divisional
managers may be linked to inter-divisional or corporate rather than exclusively
divisional profitability) (Hill, 1994)
16. The complexity and stability of such integrating
mechanisms can vary, depending on the degree of interdependence, and the uncertainty
and durability of the relations (Hill, 1994).
When strong technological interdependencies exist between divisions in a corporation
coordination on a set of standards for technology adoption decisions may yield
significant benefits. And that may be difficult, if there is no hirarchical authority to
assure that this will happen: "If potential adopters make decisions independently,
however, only weak incentives may exist for them to invest in technologies which meet
a common standard, since net gains from such investment to the individual adopter may
be small or even negative, even if net gains to the group are large. The externalities are
positive" (Argyres, 1995, p. 338-39). IBM had until recently a series of formal
procedures for coordinating the strategies of the divisions. "Foremost among these was
the so-called 'right of review'. If any division 'nonconcurred' with a strategic decision
made by another division, it could demand that the decision be 'escalated' to the next
level in the hierarchy" (Argyres, 1995, p. 349). Mostly, however, the threat of
intervention from corporate management implied that most of these disagreements were
resolved bilaterally (Goold and Campbell, 1987, p. 264).
                                                
16 IBM was in the 1970's and 1980's a "benchmarking" case of strategic planning style corporation
pursuing corporate coherence (Goold and Campbell, 1987). As one IBM executive commented: "IBM is
a very big organisation, distinctive in how tightly we link everything together. We want to integrate as
much as possible and maintain control through centralised planning and tracking, but we also want to
decentralise implementation and operating decisions. There are no major strategic decisions that are
delegated" (Goold and Campbell, 1987, p. 261). The incentive and bonus system for division managers
in IBM reflected this corporate style. Following Argyres (1995) "Division managers' bonuses were said
to depend heavily on corporate performance...Promotions of these managers were widely believed to
depend on both the performance of their divisions and on subjective evaluations of their decision-
making abilities. Those earning promotion were often seen as, in the words of one manager 'good team
players, good IBMers' (p.349).38
Corporate management of technology in Danfoss
During the first half of the 1990s Corporate Technology and Research (CTR) in Danfoss
focused strongly on the creation of synergy across product lines and technologies in the
corporation. One organizational tool designed and used by CTR is termed the
“technology pyramid” which is a strategic posture of the corporate technology base. It
contains a selection of technologies in which Danfoss can (or want to) claim world-class
expertise. These technologies have significant value for more than one division
17. Two
sub-categories of technologies in the pyramid are distinguished: 1) Technologies that are
considered "key competences" implying that Danfoss is or strives to be at the global
forefront in R&D, and 2) technologies considered "key disciplines" implying a position
among the leading competitors. Comitees consisting of members from different
divisions and CTR provide strategic analyses and guidelines for different clusters of
these technologies. Each comitee appoints a gatekeeper who is responsible for the
development and monitoring of the relevant technologies, and a sponsor who has
responsibility for budgets and for assuring proper linkages and coordination between the
commitees and gatekeepers. At the practical level inter-divisional experience groups
promote the improvement and development activities associated with each of the high-
priority technologies. The technology pyramid is not static but regularly subject to
consideration and changes.
Danfoss has moreover an elaborate network of inter-divisional commitees and groups
for among other things standardization, quality management and information
technology. The "technology pyramid" and the other networking efforts have been
established to strengthen corporate coherence and synergy.
Until the closure of CTR in 1996 (see section 4) both corporate technology
management, long-term R&D and short-term technical assistance was localized in CTR.
In a dynamic context in which the product divisions have grown larger, increasingly
autonomous, and have build their own R&D functions, there are no doubt that the
                                                
17 For technologies that are only important to one division the division in question is expected to take full
responsibility39
technology management efforts, especially as linked to the technology pyramid and
other inter-divisional networking activities, have exerted some overall “guiding”
influence on the increasingly dispersed technology base. Not a top-down guidance, but a
guidance based on interaction and consensus-building. Moreover, these measures have
stimulated horizontal technology exchange, although specific incentive mechanisms
have not been implemented to assure this. Altogether technology management has
exerted a coherence-promoting influence countervailing the centrifugal forces from the
relatively autonomous divisions. 
While the divisions' R&D for the most part has a time horizon of 1-3 years and nearly
exclusive focus on D, most of the central R&D has a horizon of 4-5 years, a  stronger R-
element, and a higher level of uncertainty. Not only does central R&D contribute to
assuring long-term explorative efforts, it also plays some role in guiding
the direction of - at least some parts of - the divisional technology base. However, the
immidiate “parenting value” of central R&D for the divisions primarily stems from the
technical support service functions and patent services and not the long-term R&D.
It is too early to make any certain judgement of the implications of the CTR-closure in
1996 (see section 4). A likely scenario is that the overall central guidance of the
corporate technology base will be somewhat reduced. Likewise, long-term explorative
R&D may be reduced, at least at the shorter term. At the longer term, however, this will
depend on the extent to which a) individual divisions build their own explorative R&D-
capacities, and/or b) corporate and divisional co-sponsorship will be organized based on
project proposals from at least two divisions. Whether horizontal synergy will be
reduced, depends on the commitment to and effectiveness of technology management
tools (such as the “technology pyramid”) and incentives to promote coherence across
divisions.
6. CONCLUSION
This paper has discussed 1) generic forces of diversified corporations and their 
implications for the corporate technology base, 2) the changing role of the central R&D
lab in the context of these forces, and 3) the (potential) role of management of40
technology in promoting dynamic coherence in diversified - and highly decentralized -
corporations.
Four overall tendencies in the growth of the multi-divisional corporation have been
identified: 1) Diversification, 2) increasing division of labour, 3) decentralization, and 4)
internationalization. It is argued that combined these dynamics have promoted an
inherent movement towards fragmentation of the corporate technology base and more
short-termism and risk-aversion in R&D-investments. However these dynamics have
also given rise to a stronger market-orientation in innovative efforts, and better
possibilities to promote inter-functional integration in innovative efforts. These
implications primarily hold for the "traditional" Williamsonian M-form corporation and
not to the same extent for the corporation that actively pursue inter-divisional synergy
and corporate coherence which is mostly the case with technology intensive
corporations.
In the context of these corporate forces for increasing diversity and complexity the role
of the central R&D lab has undergone significant changes. As divisions grow larger and
more autonomous with respect to R&D, and as the corporation grows more diversified
the central R&D lab has tended to become decoupled from the divisions' operational as
well as innovative affairs. The response to this problem has been either to close or
downsize central R&D or to make the central R&D activities dependent of divisional
funding and strategic influence, and to replace the traditional "transfer logic" by a
"teamworking logic".
While the heyday of the conventional central R&D lab is over - at least in the large
diversified corporation - the paper argues that management of the corporate technology
base has an important and growing role to play in technology-intensive diversified
corporations. Exactly the same forces that have contributed to increasing corporate
diversity and undermined the central lab's corporate monopoly on R&D, have created
the need for an overall corporate management of technology to pursue synergy and
corporate coherence.41
Four objectives for the management of the corporate technology base that may
contribute to strengthen the dynamic corporate coherence were identified and shortly
discussed: 1) Providing overall strategic guidance of the corporate technology base and
innovative efforts, 2) providing parenting value to divisions and business units in their
innovative efforts, 3) assuring a proper balance and alignment between exploitation and
exploration in innovative efforts, and 4) increasing horizontal technology exchange
coordination between divisions and business units.
If dynamic coherence of the technology base becomes a corporate strategic objective,
then corporate centre must take (at least part of the) responsibility for promoting
synergy, balancing exploitation and exploration, and assuring that the logic of
technology diversification is subject to strategic analysis in terms of technology base
coherence, and not exclusively the reflection of the business strategies of the divisions.
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